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Abstract

Two studies provide empirical support for Thibaut and Walker’s (1978) theory that
inquisitorial and adversarial dispute resolution systems are associated with different
psychological values: the pursuit of truth and the pursuit of justice. Study 1 suggests
that, in civil and criminal disputes, the adversarial system is perceived to produce less
truth than it does justice, and less truth than does the inquisitorial system. Conversely,
the inquisitorial system is perceived to produce less justice than it does truth, and less
justice than does the adversarial system. Study 2 examines how legal outcomes moderate
litigants’ perceptions of the truth and justice produced by these dispute resolution
systems. Study 2 suggests that perceptions of the truth and justice provided by the
adversarial system are highly sensitive to the outcome of the dispute, whereas perceptions
of the truth and justice provided by the inquisitorial system are not affected by dispute
outcomes. Implications for Thibaut and Walker’s theory are discussed.
Keywords: dispute resolution, comparative dispute systems, procedural justice,
decisional accuracy, courts
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Psychologists, economists, political scientists, and legal scholars have
investigated the merits of different legal procedures for resolving social disputes
(Anderson & Otto, 2003; Block & Parker, 2004; Dewatripont & Tirole, 1999; Finegan,
2009; Kessler, 2005; MacCoun, 1998; Moohr, 2004; Mosteller, 2011; Parisi, 2002;
Roach, 2010; Van Koppen & Penrod, 2003; Wolfe & Proszek, 1997). Most of the
research into these legal systems attempts to determine which system is “better” for
resolving social disputes.
The systems that have received the most scholarly attention are the autocratic,
inquisitorial model and the disputing, adversarial model of decision making (see, e.g.,
Van Koppen & Penrod, 2003). The adversarial system is characterized by an impartial
decision maker who evaluates contrasting presentations by adversaries to a dispute,
evaluates the merits of those presentations, and renders a decision that distributes a
positive outcome to one party and a corresponding negative outcome to the other
(Thibaut & Walker, 1978; Van Koppen & Penrod, 2003). In contrast, the inquisitorial
system is characterized by a decision maker who retains substantial power to elicit
evidence in an inquiry aimed at discovering the true facts underlying a dispute (Crombag,
2003; Damaska, 1973; Hayden & Anderson, 1979).
Thibaut and Walker (1978) assessed the merits of the inquisitorial and adversarial
systems in terms of the primary psychological objectives associated with each procedure.
They argued that the inquisitorial procedure is optimal for resolving disputes that are high
in “cognitive conflict”—in which arriving at the correct factual answer is of primary
importance—because the procedure is well suited for discovering the true facts
underlying the dispute (p. 543). In support, Thibaut and Walker noted that the procedure
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allows a disinterested third party a single selection strategy for gathering appropriate
evidence without potential bias from parties who might have a stake in the dispute (see
Damaska, 1973). In contrast, Thibaut and Walker argued that the adversarial procedure
is optimal for disputes high in “conflict of interest”—in which the primary objective is to
allocate resources fairly among litigants—because the adversarial procedure is well
suited for producing justice (p. 544). Thibaut and Walker noted that the adversarial
procedure allows parties to present more information directly to the decision maker,
which provides to the decision maker individualized information with respect to how to
allocate resources between the parties (see also MacCoun, 1998).
Little research has evaluated whether Americans’ perceptions of the adversarial
and inquisitorial systems align with Thibaut and Walker’s (1978) framework. Two
studies reported here examine this question. The first study examines whether, in the
context of a dispute involving scientific evidence, these systems are perceived as
prioritizing truth or justice. The second study examines whether outcome favorability
moderates participants’ perceptions of the truth and justice provided by these procedures.
Theoretical implications are discussed.
Decisional Accuracy and the Pursuit of Truth
Researchers have studied a decision-making procedure’s pursuit of truth, or
decisional accuracy, by examining the objective truth that it produces and the perceptions
of truth that it produces among litigants. Although this study focuses on perceptions of
truth, the literature from both fields is informative. Thibaut and Walker (1978)
hypothesized that the inquisitorial system produces objective truth by vesting control
over the flow of evidence with the decision maker. This suggests that the inquisitorial
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system produces greater truth than does the adversarial system, in which biased advocates
control the presentation of potentially biased evidence to the decision maker (Thibaut &
Walker, 1978). A competing hypothesis states, however, that evidence may be vetted
more vigorously in the adversarial system, where motivated advocates cross-examine
their adversary’s witnesses and expose weaknesses in their adversary’s case (Thibaut &
Walker, 1975; see also Rosenberg, Weinstein, Smit & Korn, 1976).
Lind, Thibaut, & Walker (1973) tested these competing hypotheses. Lind et al.
asked participants to gather facts—and to transmit those facts to the court—as either a
client-centered, adversarial advocate or as an unbiased, inquisitorial investigator. The
study revealed few differences in fact-finding diligence between participants in the
inquisitorial and adversarial conditions, but the study revealed substantial differences in
the transmission of facts. Participants in the adversarial condition transmitted to the court
nearly none of the facts they uncovered that disfavored their client, while participants in
the inquisitorial condition transmitted to the decision maker nearly the same proportion of
positive and negative facts that they uncovered. The study suggests that the adversarial
system may shield from the decision maker facts that are unfavorable to the parties,
which in turn may lead to inaccurate decisions. Other researchers have replicated these
findings (Sheppard & Vidmar, 1980; see also Lind & Walker, 1979).
A smaller body of research, however, suggests that the adversarial system may
counteract decision-maker bias in a manner that the inquisitorial system does not.
Thibaut et al. (1972) hypothesized that inquisitorial decision makers may prematurely
characterize a defendant as guilty if the initial facts of the defendant’s case are similar to
the facts of other cases in which defendants were found guilty. This, in turn, may lead to
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the biased assimilation of facts in the current defendant’s case. Thibaut et al. tested this
hypothesis by varying (a) the information about prior cases that was given to the decision
maker and (b) the type of procedure used to evaluate the dispute. The researchers found
that judgments of decision makers in the inquisitorial condition were influenced by the
outcomes of similar prior cases, whereas the judgments of decision makers in the
adversarial condition were not. Thibaut et al. concluded that at least one aspect of the
adversarial system reduces bias better than does the inquisitorial system. Other
researchers have found that judges are prone to the same types of decision making biases
that afflict jurors, which supports Thibaut et al.’s conclusion (see Guthrie, Rachlinski, &
Wistrich, 2001; Landsman & Rakos, 1994).
The results of studies examining perceptions of the truth produced by these
systems are similarly complex. Austin and Tobiasen (1984) examined perceptions of the
truth produced under the adversarial and inquisitorial systems and found that, depending
on the circumstances, people sometimes perceive the inquisitorial system as producing
more accurate judgments and sometimes perceive the adversarial system as more
accurate. Participants watched a videotaped trial, read a transcript, or read a summary of
legal proceedings, and then ranked the different procedures with respect to several
dependent measures, including accuracy. Across all three media, slightly over half of the
participants characterized a non-adversarial paradigm as the most accurate, but slightly
under half chose the adversarial paradigm. Moreover, no pattern emerged for the
individual media; a majority of participants sometimes chose non-adversarial procedures
as the most accurate (for example, when they watched a video of a trial simulation or
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read a trial transcript), whereas a majority sometimes chose the adversarial procedure
instead (for example, when participants read a summary of a trial).
In sum, a lack of clarity exists in the current literature with respect to the objective
and perceived accuracy of decisions produced by adversarial and inquisitorial legal
systems. Although research findings are inconclusive, the weight of the research
supports the hypothesis that the inquisitorial system is perceived to produce more truth
than does the adversarial system.
Procedural Justice and the Pursuit of Fairness
Social psychologists have defined the justice afforded by decision-making
procedures as the perception among people that the decision-making process itself is fair
and equitable (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; see also Lind & Tyler, 1988; Wendorf et al.,
1999). Researchers have found that the decision maker’s neutrality, the degree of respect
that the decision maker confers on the parties, the amount of voice and control that the
parties have over the legal dispute, and the degree to which parties can trust the decision
maker’s motive to be fair influence people’s perceptions of procedural justice (Tyler,
2006; Tyler, 2000; Tyler, 1987; Tyler & Lind, 1992).
If perceptions of procedural justice are determined, in part, by the amount of
voice and control that the decision maker affords litigants, the adversarial model—which
affords litigants more control over the proceedings than does a pure inquisitorial model—
should be perceived as more just. To the extent that heightened perceptions of procedural
justice lead to greater preferences for a procedure, a body of research supports this
hypothesis. Thibaut & Walker (1975) found that, controlling for the outcome of a legal
dispute, people generally report higher preferences for adversarial procedures compared
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to inquisitorial procedures. Other researchers have found similar effects (see, e.g.,
Houlden, LaTour, Walker, & Thibaut, 1978; LaTour, Houlden, Walker, & Thibaut, 1976;
Walker, LaTour, Lind, & Thibaut, 1974).
A smaller body of research, however, suggests that the adversarial system might
not always be perceived as more just than the inquisitorial procedure. Anderson and Otto
(2003) found cultural differences with respect to litigants’ perceptions of procedural
fairness. Although Americans preferred the adversarial system and perceived it to be
fairer than the inquisitorial system, Dutch participants preferred the inquisitorial system
and perceived it to be fairer than the adversarial system. Further, Austin and Tobiasen
(1984) have found that inquisitorial procedures are perceived as just as fair as adversarial
procedures if participants believe that the procedures are implemented reasonably (see
also Brekke, Enko, Clavet & Seelau, 1991).
In sum, the current literature examining litigants’ perceptions of the justice
provided by the inquisitorial and adversarial systems is mixed. Although a litigant’s
culture and the manner in which a legal procedure is implemented can affect litigants’
perceptions of procedural justice, the weight of the research and theory suggests that the
adversarial system produces greater perceptions of justice than does the inquisitorial
system.
Pilot Study
We developed two scales for use in the studies reported here: a measure of
participants’ perceptions of the decisional accuracy of the legal system to which they are
exposed, and a measure of their perceptions of the amount of procedural justice that it
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produces. We ran a pilot study to evaluate the convergent and discriminant validity of
these scales.
Methods
One hundred American participants were recruited via the online participation
service, Amazon Mechanical Turk, to participate in an online study in return for nominal
payment. Research indicates that Amazon Mechanical Turk is a valid source of data for
behavioral science researchers (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, &
Gosling, 2011; Mason & Suri, 2010). Participants read a vignette (see Appendix) that
served as the experimental manipulation in Study 1 and answered a series of questions
designed to measure their perceptions of how well the legal procedure would produce
factually accurate decisions and the degree to which the procedure was just. Eleven
items were developed for our scales: five items were designed to measure perceptions of
decisional accuracy while six were designed to measure perceptions of justice.
The items measuring truth perceptions were: “How likely is it that a decision
reached using this procedure will be accurate?” (“Accurate”); “How likely is it under this
procedure that a court will uncover the true facts?” (“True”); “How likely is it that this
procedure will reveal the right information that the court needs to make a decision?”
(“Right Information”); “How much confidence would you have in the court to make a
good factual decision?” (“Factual Decision”); and “How much faith do you have in a
court using this procedure to resolve disputes correctly on the facts?” (“Correct”).
The items used to measure procedural justice perceptions were: “How much
control does this procedure give people over the outcome?” (“Gives Control”); “How
much does this procedure afford people an adequate opportunity to present arguments to
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the decision maker?” (“Presents Arguments”); “How much does this procedure give
people an adequate opportunity to make their points?” (“Gives Voice”); “How much does
this procedure adequately protect people’s rights when they bring forth a legal dispute?”
(“Protects Rights”); “To what extent does this procedure treat people with dignity and
respect?” (“Provides Dignity”); and “To what extent does this procedure allow the court
to take seriously people’s legal disputes?” (“Takes Disputes Seriously”).
Additionally, participants answered the following item: “On the whole, how fair
did you find the procedure that was used to resolve the legal dispute?” Participants
responded to all questions on a seven-point Likert scale.
Results and Discussion
We analyzed these items using a principal component analysis with an oblique
rotation. Two factors emerged with eigenvalues greater than 1.00, which together
explained 78.74% of the total variance. As predicted, the items “Correct,” “Accurate,”
“True,” “Right Information,” and “Factual Decision” loaded together onto one factor,
each with a factor loading above .87. Also as predicted, the items “Protects rights,”
“Takes Disputes Seriously,” “Gives Voice,” “Presents Arguments,” “Gives Control,” and
“Provides Dignity,” loaded together onto a second factor, each with a factor loading
above .67. This suggests that the truth and justice items measured distinct latent
constructs. The items that loaded onto the separate dimensions were averaged to form
two scales, Truth (5 items, α = .96) and Justice (6 items, α = .85), respectively.
Perceptions of truth were moderately and positively related to perceptions of justice,
r(98) = .43, p < .001.
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Although we know of no existing scale for measuring participants’ perceptions of
a legal system’s decisional accuracy with which to compare our Truth scale, participants’
responses to the Justice scale were strongly associated with participants’ responses to the
individual item asking how fair they found the legal procedure, r(98) = .65, p < .001,
which suggests that the Justice scale measured perceptions of procedural justice.
Study 1
To investigate whether the relationship between people’s perceptions of truth and
justice depend on the legal procedure to which they are exposed, we manipulated whether
participants were exposed to an adversarial procedure or an inquisitorial procedure and
whether they were exposed to a civil case or a criminal case. We then measured
participants’ perceptions of the degree of truth provided by the procedure and the degree
of justice that it provided.
Predictions
We derived two sets of hypotheses from past research. The first set describes the
relationship between perceptions of truth and justice within each decision-making
system. The second set addresses whether each decision-making system is associated
more highly with truth or justice.
Within-Paradigm Hypotheses. Because biased advocates have the freedom to
produce potentially biased evidence to the decision maker in the adversarial system, we
predicted that participants would perceive the adversarial system as more just than it is
accurate. Because in a pure inquisitorial system an unbiased decision maker produces the
evidence at trial with little input from the parties, we hypothesized that participants would
perceive the inquisitorial system as more accurate than it is just.
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Between-Paradigm Hypotheses. Because biased advocates produce evidence to
the decision maker in the adversarial system but not in the pure inquisitorial system, we
predicted that participants would perceive the inquisitorial system as more accurate than
the adversarial system. Because parties in the adversarial system have more control over
the evidence that they present to the decision maker than do parties in the inquisitorial
system, we predicted that participants would perceive the adversarial system as more just
than the inquisitorial system.
Methods
Participants
One hundred and ninety-seven American participants were recruited via the
online participation service, Amazon Mechanical Turk, to participate in an online study
in return for nominal payment. Participants were 54% female, 77% Caucasian, averaged
36.11 years of age (with a standard deviation of 11.98), and ranged from 19 to 66 years of
age. Fifty-three percent of the sample had completed at least a college degree and the
median income of the sample was between $30,000 and $39,999.
Procedure and Measures
Participants were randomly assigned to a procedure (adversarial vs. inquisitorial)
x case type (civil vs. criminal) factorial design. Participants were told that researchers
were gathering information about different procedures for resolving legal disputes. They
then read about a hypothetical legal case.
Participants were randomly assigned to two different versions of the case—
criminal and civil—to determine whether the predicted effects are generalizable across
case types. In the criminal version of the case, the dispute involved whether an allergic
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reaction to a dog bite caused “severe damage” under the law to convict the defendant of a
misdemeanor. In the civil version of the case, the dispute involved whether a drug
manufacturer’s product caused internal injuries.
All participants then read about a proposed legal procedure for resolving the
dispute. In the adversarial condition, participants were told that the legal procedure
allowed litigants to call their own witnesses and to present their evidence to the decision
maker. Participants were also told that litigants under this procedure could select their
own expert witness, pay for that witness, and were not required to inform the court of any
experts that they had interviewed but declined to hire, in accordance with the procedure
in the adversarial system in the United States. They were also told that the decision
maker would make a decision on the merits of each party’s presentation.
In the inquisitorial condition, participants were told that the decision maker would
decide which witnesses would testify at the trial. Participants were also told that the
court would, among other things, appoint an expert witness to testify regarding the
scientific issues raised in the case, and that the witness would work independently of the
plaintiff and the defendant. Participants were told that the decision maker would question
all of the witnesses under this procedure and would then make its decision.
Participants next completed a series of comprehension checks. The
comprehension checks consisted of several questions designed to measure whether the
participants understood the procedure by which the various witnesses would be selected
and examined. Participants could not advance in the survey until they answered these
questions correctly. All participants answered the comprehension questions correctly and
completed the survey.

	
  

THE TRUTH-JUSTICE TRADEOFF

14

Participants then answered a series of questions, described in the pilot study,
designed to measure their perceptions of how well the legal procedure would produce
factually accurate decisions and the degree to which the procedure was just.
Before being debriefed, participants provided basic demographic information,
including their age, gender, race, ethnicity, income, and political orientation. They were
also asked whether they had ever spent time in a courtroom and in what capacity. Fifteen
percent of participants had been a litigant or witness in a legal proceeding, 22% had been
summoned for jury duty, and 23% had appeared in court for minor traffic violations.
None of these variables, including participants’ experience with the legal system,
produced systematic effects across the dependent measures in our study and are not
discussed further.
Results
Results are reported in two parts. First, we conducted a preliminary test to
determine if we could pool the data from participants in our civil and criminal case
conditions. We then examined participants’ perceptions of truth and justice when they
were exposed to different legal procedures.
Preliminary Analysis
A mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to analyze the
data. The analysis included (a) two between-subjects factors: case type (criminal vs.
civil) and procedure (adversarial vs. inquisitorial); and (b) one within-subjects factor,
which captured participants’ judgments of the amount of truth and the amount of justice
produced by each procedure. As expected, a 2 (case type: criminal vs. civil) x 2
(procedure: adversarial vs. inquisitorial) x 2 (evaluation: truth vs. justice) ANOVA with
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repeated measures on the last variable revealed no main effect of case type, F(1, 193) =
3.52, p = .062, η2p = .02,1 no interaction between case type and procedure, F(1, 193) =
0.11, p = .741, η2p = .00, no interaction between case type and evaluation, F(1, 193) =
0.98, p = .322, η2p = .01, and (most importantly) no three-way interaction between case
type, procedure, and evaluation, F(1, 193) = 0.10, p = .754, η2p = .00. Thus, data from
participants exposed to the civil case and data from participants exposed to the criminal
case were combined.
Main Analysis: Truth and Justice
To test the hypothesis that perceptions of truth and justice would differ (a) within
each decision-making procedure and (b) between decision-making procedures, we
performed a 2 (procedure: adversarial vs. inquisitorial) x 2 (evaluation: truth vs. justice)
ANOVA with repeated measures on the second variable. As predicted, the analysis
revealed a significant interaction between evaluation and procedure, F(1, 195) = 133.47,
p < .001, η2p = .41 (see Figure 1).
Within-paradigm comparisons. Because we expected that participants exposed
to an adversarial procedure would perceive it as less accurate than it is just, and because
we expected that participants exposed to an inquisitorial procedure would perceive it as
less just than it is accurate, we examined the nature of the interaction reported above
when participants were exposed to an adversarial procedure and when they were exposed
to an inquisitorial procedure.
An analysis of participants’ perceptions when they were exposed to an adversarial
dispute revealed a statistically significant effect of evaluation, F(1, 99) = 32.74, p < .001,
η2p = .25, such that evaluations of truth (M = 4.29, SD = 1.52) were lower than
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participants’ evaluations of justice (M = 4.87, SD = 1.08). Thus, as predicted,
participants perceived the adversarial procedure to be more just than it is accurate.2
Conversely, and as predicted, an analysis of participants’ perceptions when they
were exposed to an inquisitorial dispute revealed a statistically significant effect of
evaluation, F(1, 96) = 105.49, p < .001, η2p = .52, such that evaluations of truth (M =
5.19, SD = 1.38) were higher than participants’ evaluations of justice (M = 3.97, SD =
1.25). Thus, participants perceived the inquisitorial procedure to be more accurate than it
is just.
Between-paradigm comparisons. Because we expected that (a) the adversarial
procedure would be perceived as less accurate than the inquisitorial procedure, and (b)
the inquisitorial procedure would be perceived as less just than the adversarial procedure,
we next examined the nature of the interaction reported above in terms of participants’
perceptions of truth and justice.
An analysis of participants’ perceptions of decisional accuracy revealed a
statistically significant effect of procedure, F(1, 195) = 19.14, p < .001, η2p = .09, such
that participants perceived the adversarial system (M = 4.29, SD = 1.50) as less accurate
than the inquisitorial system (M = 5.19, SD = 1.38).
Conversely, and as predicted, an analysis of participants’ perceptions of
procedural justice revealed a statistically significant effect of procedure, F(1, 195) =
29.29, p < .001, η2p = .13, such that participants perceived the inquisitorial system (M =
3.97, SD = 1.25) as less just than the adversarial system (M = 4.87, SD = 1.08).
Discussion
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Although many of the effect sizes observed in Study 1 are modest, the findings
suggest that participants’ perceptions of the truth and justice provided by adversarial and
inquisitorial procedures aligns with Thibaut and Walker’s (1978) hypothesis that these
systems prioritize different psychological goals. Participants exposed to an adversarial
procedure perceived it to produce verdicts that were more just than they were accurate.
Conversely, participants exposed to an inquisitorial procedure perceived it as producing
verdicts that were more accurate than just. Moreover, a comparison of the adversarial
and inquisitorial systems revealed that the adversarial system was perceived as providing
less truth to litigants than did the inquisitorial system, whereas the inquisitorial system
was perceived as providing less justice to litigants than did the adversarial system.
Study 2
Study 1 suggests that perceptions of the truth provided by legal procedures differ
from perceptions of the justice that they provide. Study 1 focused on these perceptions
independent of legal outcomes, but the purpose of these procedures, ultimately, is to
facilitate a resolution to legal disputes. Study 2 addresses how outcome information
moderates perceptions of the truth and justice provided by these procedures. It also
proposes a mediator of outcome effects in disputes involving scientific evidence.
Truth, Justice, and Outcome Favorability
Outcome favorability can exert considerable influence over our perceptions,
judgments, and behaviors (Brockner et al., 1997). It can moderate people’s job
performance (Smither et al., 1993), retaliation behavior (Latham & Wexley, 1994),
decision acceptance (Skitka, 2002), affect (Bies et al., 1993), and organizational
citizenship (Farh et al., 1997; for a review, see Skitka, Winquist, & Hutchinson, 2003).

	
  

THE TRUTH-JUSTICE TRADEOFF

18

Little research exists, however, comparing how outcomes affect perceptions of truth and
justice in adversarial and inquisitorial dispute paradigms.
Favorable outcomes generally produce greater perceptions of decisional accuracy
(see, e.g., Brett & Atwater, 2001; Halperin, Snyder, Schenkel, & Houston, 1976).
Although no studies have examined the role that outcomes have on perceptions of
decisional accuracy across legal decision-making paradigms, studies examining verdict
satisfaction can provide a useful proxy. Two studies have directly compared the
inquisitorial and adversarial systems with respect to the effects of outcome favorability
on verdict satisfaction. Austin et al. (1981) found a significant interaction between the
procedure to which participants were exposed and the outcome they received in a
simulated hit-and-run trial. Austin et al. reported that the interaction was driven by
substantial “polarity within the adversarial condition[]” (p. 294), such that higher
satisfaction was associated with favorable outcomes. Notably, the judgments from
participants exposed to the inquisitorial procedure did not exhibit such polarity.
Similarly, in a study in which participants stood trial for cheating in a laboratory
experiment, although LaTour (1978) did not find a statistically significant interaction
between procedure and outcome, the means for the adversarial and inquisitorial
conditions exhibited a similar pattern. Participants in the adversarial condition appeared
sensitive to outcome information with respect to their satisfaction judgments, while
participants in the inquisitorial condition were not.
Studies that have examined the relationship between outcome information and
perceptions of justice have done so primarily in non-legal contexts, in which researchers
presented participants with a set of rules that vary in fairness (for a review, see Brockner
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& Wiesenfeld, 1996; Skitka, Winquist, & Hutchinson, 2003). To the extent that the
adversarial legal paradigm is perceived by litigants as fairer than the inquisitorial system
because participants perceive it to provide them with greater voice, respect, and control
over the proceedings (see, e.g., Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler, 1988), these studies
provide insight into the manner that outcomes affect perceptions of justice across
decision-making procedures. One body of research suggests that perceptions of fairer
procedures are influenced more heavily by outcomes than are less fair procedures.
Specifically, researchers have found that preferences for a procedure and perceptions of
its fairness are highest when a fair procedure is paired with a favorable outcome, while
preferences for a procedure and perceptions of its fairness are lowest when a fair
procedure is paired with an unfavorable outcome, a phenomenon called the frustration
effect (Cohen, 1985; Folger, 1977; Folger et al., 1979; Greenberg & Folger, 1983; Lind
& Tyler, 1988; Kulik & Clark, 1993).
Other researchers, however, have found that outcomes have a greater effect on
perceptions of procedural fairness when the procedures themselves are less fair (Brockner
& Weisenfeld, 1996). This may occur, however, only when the correctness of the
outcome is ambiguous (Kulik & Clark, 1993; van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke,
1997). Moreover, it in unclear whether the outcome effects reported in these studies can
generalize to legal contexts, where the stakes of winning and losing are higher.
Thus, although case-specific attributes may moderate these effects, the majority of
the research on the impact of outcome favorability on people’s perceptions of decisional
accuracy and procedural justice suggests that judgments made under an adversarial
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procedure are more polarized in response to case outcomes than are judgments made
under an inquisitorial procedure. Study 2 tests this hypothesis.
Predictions for Study 2
Main Analysis. Based on research examining verdict satisfaction and
perceptions of fairness in non-legal contexts, we predict that participants will be more
sensitive to outcomes in the adversarial condition than in the inquisitorial condition.
Mediation. We conducted a mediation analysis to determine the cause of any
differences that emerge with respect to the effects of legal outcome on perceptions of
truth and justice. Past research suggests that policymakers have become concerned about
the presence of “hired gun” expert witnesses that testify in cases involving scientific
evidence in the adversarial system, because citizens perceive these experts as non-neutral
and whose testimony is “for sale” (Cooper & Neuhaus, 2000; Saks & Wissler, 1984; Saks
& VanDuizend, 1983). No one has yet examined whether the presence of these nonneutral, “hired gun” experts affects citizens’ perceptions of the truth and justice produced
by the adversarial system compared to the inquisitorial system, where parties generally
cannot hire their own expert witnesses. The number of legal cases that require scientific
expertise continues to grow in the United States, which makes this variable an important
theoretical and practical mediator to examine in the context of our vignette, which
involved a scientific case (see, e.g., Saks & Wissler, 1984). We thus predicted that the
perceived neutrality of the expert witness would mediate the relationship between the
outcome participants received and their assessments of the procedure’s truth and justice
in the adversarial system, but not in the inquisitorial system.
Methods
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Participants
One hundred and sixty-five American participants were recruited online through
Amazon Mechanical Turk and received nominal payment to participate in an online
study. Participants were 52% female, 80% Caucasian, averaged 37.61 years of age
(standard deviation = 11.72) and ranged from 19 to 70 years of age. Fifty-five percent of
the sample had completed at least a college degree, and the median income of the sample
was between $40,000 and $49,999.
Procedure and Measures
Participants read a case in which they were asked to imagine that they had taken a
defendant corporation’s blood pressure drug, experienced violent stomach pains that left
them hospitalized, and sued the defendant in a civil proceeding for monetary damages.
Identical expert testimony was revealed in all experimental conditions. In the adversarial
condition, facts were revealed through direct- and cross- examination of the expert. In
the inquisitorial condition, the expert relayed the same facts through one examination by
the judge.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two outcome conditions. In the
favorable outcome condition, participants were told that the decision maker deliberated
and found in their favor. In the unfavorable outcome condition, participants were told
that the decision maker deliberated and found in favor of the drug manufacturer.
Participants then answered questions, as they did in Study 1, to measure their
impressions of the truth and justice provided by these decision-making procedures.
Additionally, for the purpose of a mediation analysis, participants were asked three
questions designed to measure the degree to which they perceived the expert witness to
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be neutral: “How motivated were the experts to give testimony that was not slanted
toward one party?”; “How motivated were the experts to testify truthfully?”; and “How
motivated were the expert witnesses to be unbiased?” To ensure that these items were not
simply additional components of our justice measure, we conducted a principal
component analysis with an oblique rotation in which we included these three items. The
analysis revealed three factors: the truth items loaded onto one factor, the justice items
loaded onto a second factor, and the expert neutrality items loaded onto a third factor
with factor loadings above .85. The items measuring expert neutrality were averaged to
form an expert neutrality scale (3 items, α = .92).
Finally, participants were asked demographic questions and were debriefed. As
in Study 1, they also were asked whether they had ever spent time in a courtroom and in
what capacity. Seventeen percent of participants had been a litigant or witness in a legal
proceeding, 27% had been summoned for jury duty, and 22% had appeared in court for
minor traffic violations. As in Study 1, none of these variables, including participants’
experience with the legal system, produced systematic effects across the dependent
measures in our study and are not discussed further.
Results
Results are reported in two parts. First, we conducted the main analysis, in which
we examined participants’ perceptions of the truth and justice produced by adversarial
and inquisitorial procedures when they were exposed to different legal outcomes.
Second, we conducted a mediation analysis to determine the pathway between the
outcome that participants received and their perceptions of truth and justice.
Main Analysis: Truth and Justice
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As in Study 1, a mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to
analyze the data. The analysis included (a) two between-subjects factors: procedure
(adversarial vs. inquisitorial) and outcome (favorable vs. unfavorable); and (b) one
within-subjects factor, which captured participants judgments of the amount of truth and
the amount of justice produced by each procedure. To test the hypothesis that the
outcome of the dispute would affect participants’ perceptions of truth and justice
depending on the legal paradigm to which they were exposed, we conducted a 2
(procedure: adversarial vs. inquisitorial) x 2 (outcome: favorable vs. unfavorable) x 2
(evaluation: truth vs. justice) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last variable. As
predicted, the analysis revealed a main effect of outcome, such that participants’
evaluations of truth and justice were higher when they received a favorable outcome (M =
4.77, SD = 1.48) than when they received an unfavorable outcome (M = 4.35, SD = 1.38),
F(1, 161) = 6.55, p = .011, η2p = .04.
This main effect was qualified by two significant two-way interactions. First, the
analysis revealed an interaction between evaluation and procedure, F(1, 161) = 42.37, p <
.001, η2p = .21, which replicates the results we found in Study 1. When we examined
within-paradigm effects, we found that participants rated the adversarial system as more
just (M = 4.76, SD = 1.38) than it was accurate (M = 4.43, SD = 1.46), F(1, 85) = 8.77, p
= .004, η2p = .09, and they rated the inquisitorial system as more accurate (M = 5.01, SD
= 1.36) than it was just (M = 4.27, SD = 1.45), F(1, 78) = 40.87, p < .001, η2p = .34.
When we examined between-paradigm effects, we found that the adversarial procedure
(M = 4.76, SD = 1.38) was perceived to be more just than the inquisitorial procedure (M
= 4.27, SD = 1.45), F(1, 163) = 4.89, p = .028, η2p = .03, and the inquisitorial procedure
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(M = 5.01, SD = 1.36) was perceived to be more accurate than the adversarial procedure
(M = 4.43, SD = 1.46), F(1, 163) = 7.08, p = .009, η2p = .04.
Second, and as expected, the analysis revealed a significant interaction between
the procedure to which participants were exposed and the outcome they received, F(1,
161) = 6.42, p = .012, η2p = .04 (see Figure 2).3 Because we found no three-way
interaction, F(1, 161) = 0.07, p = .799, η2p = .00, and because we hypothesized that
outcome favorability would affect participants’ perceptions of the legal system differently
across procedural conditions, we investigated this interaction by examining the effects of
outcome when participants were exposed to an adversarial system and when they were
exposed to an inquisitorial system.
When participants were exposed to an adversarial system, they evaluated the
system as producing more truth and justice when they received a favorable outcome (M =
5.21, SD = 1.25) than when they received an unfavorable outcome (M = 4.19, SD = 1.21),
F(1, 84) = 14.30, p < .001, η2p = .15. In contrast, the outcome that participants received
did not affect their evaluations of the inquisitorial system (MFavorable = 4.65, SDFavorable =
1.35; MUnfavorable = 4.64, SDUnfavorable = 1.30), F(1, 77) = 0.00, p = .987, η2p = .00. Thus,
as predicted, participants’ evaluations of the adversarial system were affected by the
outcome that they received, whereas the outcome did not affect participants’ evaluations
of the inquisitorial system.
Mediated Moderation Analysis
To understand the reason why the legal outcome and legal procedure to which
participants were exposed affected their evaluations of the procedure in the adversarial
condition but not in the inquisitorial condition, we performed a mediation analysis with
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respect to their evaluations of the expert witness involved in the case. Because the
perceived truth and justice that these procedures produce are separate constructs, we
performed the mediation analysis on these dependent variables separately.
Perceptions of Truth. We first tested whether the interactive effect of legal
outcome and legal procedure predicted participants’ perceptions of the truth produced by
the procedure. In the first model, we included (a) legal outcome, legal procedure, and
their interactive effect as predictor variables and (b) perceptions of truth as the dependent
variable. Linear regression analysis revealed that the interactive effect of legal outcome
and legal procedure on participants’ perceptions of truth was statistically significant, b =
0.98, SE = 0.43, p = .025, such that favorable legal outcomes were associated with
increases in perceptions of truth when participants were exposed to an adversarial
procedure, b = 1.09, SE = 0.30, p < .001, but not when they were exposed to an
inquisitorial procedure, b = 0.11, SE = 0.31, p = .725 (see Figure 3).
We then constructed a second model in which we included (a) legal outcome,
legal procedure, and their interactive effect as predictor variables and (b) the expert’s
perceived neutrality (centered) as the dependent variable. A linear regression revealed
that the interactive effect of legal outcome and legal procedure on perceptions of the
expert’s neutrality was statistically significant, b = 1.22, SE = 0.49, p = .014. Participants
exposed to an adversarial procedure perceived the expert as less objective when they
received a less favorable outcome, b = -1.14, SE = 0.36, p = .002, whereas participants
exposed to an inquisitorial procedure did not, b = 0.08, SE = 0.33, p = .820.
Finally, we constructed a third model, in which we included as predictor variables
the following: (a) legal outcome, legal procedure, the interactive effect of legal outcome
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and legal procedure in one block and (b) perceptions of the expert’s neutrality in a second
block. We included perceptions of truth as the dependent variable. Higher ratings of the
expert’s neutrality were associated with higher ratings of perceived truth, b = 0.39, SE =
0.07, p < .001. Most importantly, and as predicted, the interaction between legal outcome
and legal procedure on perceptions of truth became non-significant when ratings of the
expert’s neutrality were added to the model, b = 0.63, SE = 0.43, p = .138. Thus, as
confirmed by bootstrapping analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 2004),4 perceptions of an
expert’s neutrality fully mediated the effect of outcome and legal procedure on
participants’ perceptions of truth, b = 0.48, SE = 0.23, 95% CI [0.06, 0.97].
Perceptions of Justice. We performed a similar mediation analysis on
participants’ perceptions of justice. In the first model, the analysis revealed that the
interactive effect of legal outcome and legal procedure was statistically significant, b =
1.06, SE = 0.44, p = .016, such that participants exposed to an adversarial procedure
perceived the procedure to be less just when they received a negative outcome, b = -0.96,
SE = 0.31, p = .002, while participants exposed to an inquisitorial procedure did not, b =
0.09, SE = 0.31, p = .752 (see Figure 4).
When we examined expert neutrality as the dependent variable, the regression
revealed that the interactive effect of legal outcome and legal procedure on perceptions of
the expert’s neutrality was statistically significant, b = 1.22, SE = 0.49, p = .014.
Participants exposed to an adversarial procedure perceived the expert as less objective
when they received a less favorable outcome, b = -1.14, SE = 0.36, p = .002, whereas
participants exposed to an inquisitorial procedure did not, b = 0.08, SE = 0.33, p = .82.
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Finally, in a regression model that included expert neutrality as a predictor
variable in a second block, the analysis revealed that higher ratings of the expert’s
neutrality were associated with higher ratings of perceived justice, b = 0.35, SE = 0.07, p
< .001. Most importantly, and as predicted, the interaction between legal outcome and
legal procedure on perceptions of justice became non-significant when ratings of the
expert’s neutrality were added to the model, b = 0.73, SE = 0.44, p = .103. As confirmed
by bootstrapping analysis, perceptions of an expert’s neutrality fully mediated the effect
of outcome and legal procedure on participants’ perceptions of justice, b = 0.43, SE =
0.20, 95% CI [0.07, 0.86].
The mediated moderation analysis revealed stark contrasts. For participants who
experienced an adversarial procedure, the outcome they received influenced their
perceptions of the expert witness’s neutrality, which was also associated with their
perceptions of both the truth and justice provided by the adversarial procedure. The
effects were different for participants who experienced an inquisitorial procedure.
Although their perceptions of the expert witness’s neutrality was associated with their
perceptions of the truth and justice provided by the inquisitorial procedure, the outcome
they received did not influence their perceptions of the expert witness’s neutrality.
Discussion
Study 2 extended the findings of Study 1 by examining the moderating role of
outcome favorability on litigants’ perceptions of truth and justice. As predicted, the
outcome of a legal dispute affected participants’ evaluations of the adversarial system,
although the size of the effect was modest. Figure 2 illustrates the polarity in
participants’ evaluations of the adversarial procedure: favorable outcomes in the
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adversarial system produced the highest evaluations of the procedure and unfavorable
outcomes in the adversarial system produced the lowest evaluations. This is consistent
with a frustration effect, whereby preferences for a procedure and perceptions of its
fairness are highest when a fair procedure is paired with a favorable outcome, while
preferences for a procedure and perceptions of its fairness are lowest when a fair
procedure is paired with an unfavorable outcome (Cohen, 1985; Folger, 1977; Folger et
al., 1979; Greenberg & Folger, 1983; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Kulik & Clark, 1993). No
such polarity was found for judgments made after exposure to the inquisitorial system.
A mediated moderation analysis supports our hypothesis that in cases involving
scientific evidence in the adversarial system, perceptions of the expert witness’s
neutrality mediated the relationship between the outcome participants received and their
perceptions of truth and justice. Participants perceived these party-proffered experts as
non-neutral when they received unfavorable outcomes compared to the court-appointed
experts to which participants were exposed in the inquisitorial system.
General Discussion
Two studies reveal that litigants’ perceptions of the adversarial and inquisitorial
legal systems are consistent with Thibaut and Walker’s (1978) theory that these systems
prioritize different psycholegal goals. The studies reported here confirm that in the
context of scientific disputes, there are several statistically significant differences in the
way these decision-making paradigms are perceived by potential litigants. Potential
litigants perceive the adversarial paradigm as producing less accurate verdicts in these
cases than it does verdicts that are just, and they perceive the adversarial paradigm as
producing more justice in these cases than does the inquisitorial paradigm. Conversely,
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litigants perceive the inquisitorial paradigm as producing more truth than it produces
justice, and they perceive the inquisitorial paradigm as producing more truth than does
the adversarial paradigm.
The favorability of the outcomes that participants receive moderates these
perceptions. Ratings of the truth and justice produced by the adversarial system exhibited
polarity in ways consistent with past literature: when participants received a favorable
outcome, their perceptions of the truth and justice provided by the adversarial procedure
increased, and when they received an unfavorable outcome, their perceptions decreased.
Notably, as illustrated in Figure 3, when participants in the adversarial condition received
a favorable outcome, perceptions of the truth produced by the adversarial system
increased to levels that are statistically similar to the perceptions of truth produced by the
inquisitorial system. As illustrated in Figure 4, when participants in the adversarial
condition received an unfavorable outcome, perceptions of the justice produced by the
adversarial system decreased to levels that are statistically similar to the perceptions of
justice produced by the inquisitorial system. In contrast, we observed no polarity in
participants’ perceptions of the truth or justice provided by the inquisitorial procedure in
response to case outcomes.
Several implications flow from these findings. Scholars of dispute systems are
currently investigating the merits of adversarial and inquisitorial dispute resolution
paradigms (Anderson & Otto, 2003; Block & Parker, 2004; Dewatripont & Triole, 1999;
Finegan, 2009; Kessler, 2005; MacCoun, 1998; Moohr, 2004; Mosteller, 2011; Parisi,
2002; Roach, 2010; Van Koppen & Penrod, 2003; Wolfe & Proszek, 1997). The studies
reported here suggest that, in the context of disputes over scientific evidence, the
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inquisitorial system can claim some clear advantages over the adversarial system—for
example, a perception of greater accuracy and less sensitivity to outcome information—
but these advantages do come at the cost of perceived fairness, at least among these
respondents. Future research might identify other underlying mechanisms that cause
litigants in the adversarial system to be more sensitive to outcome information compared
to litigants in the inquisitorial system. For example, does the act of producing one’s own
evidence to the decision maker cause participants to become more invested in the
outcome of a dispute than if they do not have the ability to produce their own evidence?
Although we might hypothesize that people who have spent resources filing a lawsuit
will be invested in the outcome of the lawsuit regardless of the procedure used to resolve
it, researchers have found that perceptions of voice have powerful effects on perceptions
of dispute systems (for a review, see Tyler & Markell, 2010).
It is also possible that American participants may have felt less invested in the
inquisitorial system in our study because they are less familiar with that legal system.
This, in turn, might have made them less sensitive to favorable and unfavorable outcomes
in the inquisitorial condition. We know of no published studies that have shown that
unfamiliarity with a legal procedure leads to lower investment in that procedure, but
future researchers should examine this potential explanation.
Future research might also examine individual difference variables that predict
preferences for adversarial or inquisitorial procedures. To the extent that the inquisitorial
system is associated with decisional accuracy, individuals high in ambiguity intolerance
and in the need for cognitive closure may prefer that procedure to the adversarial
procedure (see Budner, 1962; Kruglanski & Webster, 1994). Similarly, individuals high

	
  

THE TRUTH-JUSTICE TRADEOFF

31

in moral self-identity might prefer the adversarial procedure, which participants in this
study associated with justice (Aquino & Reed, 2002).
Further, in light of Anderson and Otto’s (2003) research that Dutch participants
and American participants each preferred their home country’s decision making system,
researchers should test whether the findings reported here—in which American
participants perceived the adversarial system to produce more justice than the
inquisitorial system and vice-versa with respect to their perceptions of accuracy—
replicate to samples of participants from other countries.
The results reported here also have implications for scholars of juries and courts.
Disputes involving scientific evidence routinely involve the testimony of expert
witnesses. The mediated moderation analysis reported here suggests that perceptions of
the neutrality of these experts are associated with litigants’ perceptions of the adversary
system. Research in this vein is expanding (see, e.g., Brekke, Enko, Clavet, & Seelau,
1991; Cooper & Neuhaus, 2000) and should focus, for example, on determining the ways
in which policymakers can mitigate the perception that hired-gun experts affect the
accuracy of verdicts produced by the adversarial system (see, e.g., Saks & Van Duizend,
1983).
The current study is subject to limitations. In vignette studies, it is always
difficult to gauge the degree of attention put forth by participants and the degree to which
they truly imagined being a litigating plaintiff, as participants did in Study 2. Safeguards
were put in place to account for this, to some degree, by including attention checks and
comprehension checks. In addition, we examined the data for obvious cases of suspect
responses—for example, answering “strongly disagree” for every item in the study—and
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found no data to exclude. Nonetheless, reading about a legal proceeding in a vignette
study is a different psychological experience than actually being involved in litigation.
Especially in light of the small effect sizes found in the studies reported here, future
research should attempt to replicate the results obtained here in a field study with greater
ecological validity. Measuring the perceptions of real litigants would be beneficial to our
understanding of how these legal systems are perceived “from the inside.”
The manner in which we measured procedural justice merits some caution as
well. Many studies have measured procedural justice by examining the degree to which
participants experience its components, such as their perceptions of the degree of respect
they received, the degree of control they believe they had during the proceedings, and the
perceived neutrality of the decision maker (see, e.g., Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992;
Tyler & Markell, 2010). Other researchers, however, measure procedural justice by
explicitly asking participants to quantify the degree to which they were treated fairly (see,
e.g., Folger, 1977), because equating a construct to its antecedents may lead to an
inaccurate measurement of the construct. Moreover, although research suggests that
perceptions of procedural justice and satisfaction with those procedures are separate
psychological constructs (see, e.g., Adler, Hensler & Nelson, 1983; Lind & Tyler, 1988),
we cannot fully eliminate the possibility that our justice measure also measured
satisfaction.
Finally, in practice, inquisitorial decision makers exhibit variation with respect to
the degree of control they exercise over legal proceedings (see, e.g., Sheppard, 1985).
Because this study is the first to compare participants’ perceptions of the truth and justice
produced by adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems, we tested these perceptions in the
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context of a “pure” adversarial system and a “pure” inquisitorial system, where
participants experienced clear differences in the amount of voice and control that they
had in the proceedings. By examining participants’ perceptions of truth and justice at the
“outer boundaries” along the continuum that exists between adversarial and inquisitorial
procedures, our construction of the inquisitorial model was necessarily simplified. Future
research should examine whether differences in perceptions of truth and justice exist with
respect to hybrid adversarial and inquisitorial models.
The question of which legal procedure is “better” for resolving social disputes is a
difficult one that has generated substantial scholarly inquiry. This might be the wrong
question to ask, however, because litigants perceive these different legal procedures to
prioritize different psycholegal goals, such as the pursuit of truth and the pursuit of
justice (Crombag, 2003; Thibaut & Walker, 1978). Continued research into litigants’
perceptions of these procedures can assist policymakers in creating dispute systems that
align more closely with the policy preferences of their citizens.
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Figure 1. Perceptions of truth and justice as a function of legal procedure. Error bars

	
  

represent standard errors of the mean. Effect sizes (η2p) are as follows: (a) for the
interaction between evaluation and legal procedure: .41; (b) for the within-paradigm
effect of evaluation in the adversarial system: .25; (c) for the within-paradigm effect of
evaluation in the inquisitorial system: .52; (d) for the between-paradigm effect of legal
procedure with respect to perceptions of truth: .09; and (e) for the between paradigmeffect of legal procedure with respect to perceptions of justice: .13.
** denotes p < .001.
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Figure 2. Evaluations of truth and justice (as a composite variable) as a function of legal
outcome and decision making paradigm. Error bars represent standard errors of the
mean. Effect sizes (η2p) are as follows: (a) for the interaction between legal procedure
and outcome: .04; and (b) for the effect of outcome in the adversarial system: .15.
** denotes p < .001.
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Figure 3. Perceptions of truth as a function of legal procedure and outcome. Error bars
represent standard errors of the mean. Effect sizes (η2p) are as follows: (a) for the
interaction between legal procedure and outcome: .04; and (b) for the effect of outcome
in the adversarial system: .12.
** denotes p < .001.
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Figure 4. Perceptions of justice as a function of legal procedure and outcome. Error bars
represent standard errors of the mean. Effect sizes (η2p) are as follows: (a) for the
interaction between legal procedure and outcome: .03; and (b) for the effect of outcome
in the adversarial system: .13.
** denotes p < .001.
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Footnotes

1. Although it was not statistically significant, the analysis revealed a marginal
effect of case type, such that evaluations of the truth and justice produced in
criminal cases (M = 4.73, SD = 1.05) were higher than evaluations of the truth and
justice produced in civil cases (M = 4.31, SD = 1.30).

2. Bonferroni analyses were conducted on all planned comparisons to reduce the
likelihood of Type I error. All effects reported in Study 1 remained statistically
significant under the conservative Bonferroni procedure (all ps < .01).

3. Because no three-way interaction existed between procedure, outcome, and
evaluation, evaluations of truth and justice are plotted together in Figure 2 as a
composite “evaluation” variable.

4. Bootstrapping is a nonparametric technique for testing indirect effects that does
not assume that the variables of interest are normally distributed. The
bootstrapping technique takes a large number of samples, with replacement, from
the data and computes the indirect effect for each sample. The 95% confidence
interval is derived by sorting the elements of the vector of the indirect effect from
low to high. For a sample of 5000, the 250th score in the sorted distribution
defines the lower limit of the confidence interval, and the upper limit is defined as
the 4751st score. If the confidence interval does not include a value of 0, the
indirect effect is statistically significant (see Preacher & Hayes, 2004).
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Appendix

Below is a sample vignette used in the studies reported in this manuscript. All
vignettes are available from the author by request and are available online at the
American Psychological Association’s website.
Sample Vignette
There are many ways in which decision makers can resolve legal disputes. For
example, sometimes people have those disputes settled in a court of law. Other times,
they have their cases resolved through a process called “arbitration,” where a neutral
third-party (who isn’t always a judge) will decide the case instead of a jury, or through a
non-binding process called “mediation.” Helping policy makers study different methods
of resolving legal disputes may aid the legal system in functioning more efficiently and
more affordably. In studying different methods of solving legal disputes, policy makers
often look to what members of the public think about these methods, because if there is
widespread support, the methods might be implemented more quickly. Thus, we ask for
your help today.
With this in mind, please carefully read the short vignette (hypothetical story) on
the following page and think carefully about the way in which the legal dispute is
resolved. (We'll ask you questions about what you've read.) Authorities currently
disagree about the appropriateness of the methods used to resolve the dispute in the
vignette, and so your feedback is very much appreciated.
In the vignette, we ask that you imagine that you are suing a drug manufacturer
for an illness that you believe the drug caused. The vignette is relatively short, but we
ask that you read the vignette (and answer the questions that follow) as if it were a real
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trial. At the trial, you and the drug manufacturer agree on all of the important facts
except one: whether a popular antibiotic drug led to a severe stomach illness you
contracted (which caused you to spend several weeks in the hospital and miss several
weeks of work). This is the main issue to be resolved at the trial.
Here is the process the court will use to resolve the dispute:
•

Each party (you, the “plaintiff,” and the drug company, the “defendant”)
will present their own witnesses and their own case to the jury. The court
will decide the case based on those presentations.

•

Each party may also present their own expert scientific witness to testify
about the effects of the drug.

•

Each party pays for their own expert, should they decide to hire one, and
may look at different experts until they find one who is acceptable to them
and will testify on their behalf. Neither party has to tell the other one (or
the court) the identity of the experts they looked at before they chose the
one who ultimately testifies.

•

The lawyers for both parties have the opportunity to ask questions of each
other’s witnesses.

You have called several witnesses, including your family members (who can
attest that you took the medication) and your family doctor (who can attest to your
symptoms at the hospital). The drug company’s lawyer did not ask any questions of
these witnesses. You also hired an expert witness to testify. In response to your lawyer’s
questions, your expert testifies as follows:
•
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Several studies conclusively show that the defendant’s antibiotic causes
stomach bleeding in rats and mice in the laboratory.

•

Animal studies can tell us a lot about the effects of chemicals on humans.

•

Almost every substance that has been shown to cause stomach bleeding in
humans was first shown to be a cause of stomach bleeding in animals.

In response to questions from the drug company’s lawyer, your expert testifies as
follows:
•

You are paying him $2000 for his testimony, which he says is the
customary rate.

•

He has testified as an expert in over 50 cases involving defective drugs,
but he claims that he is unbiased.

•

Humans and rats are different species.

•

A study of human beings revealed that, over the span of 5 years, only a
few more people got sick after taking the drug than we would expect by
mere chance.

•

Human studies might require more time for the effects of the drug on
humans to be apparent.

After all of the testimony was heard, both attorneys gave closing arguments to the
court. The court was required to find in your favor if it believes by a preponderance of
the evidence (i.e., that it is more likely than not) that the drug company’s medication
caused your illness. The court later returned a verdict in your favor.

	
  

